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DISCRETION AS DELEGATION:
 THE “PROPER” UNDERSTANDING OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Gary Lawson*
The nondelegation doctrine, as it has been traditionally understood, maintains that 
the federal Constitution places limits (however modest) on the kind and quantity of 
discretion that Congress can grant to other actors.  Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
have recently described this doctrine as a “neurotic burden”1 on the legal system that 
“lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources, 
or in sound economic and political theory.”2  They agree that the Constitution forbids 
Congress from delegating to other actors the formal power to enact legislation through 
the Article I voting process,3 but they argue that “a statutory grant of authority to the 
executive branch or other agents can never amount to a delegation of legislative power,”4
no matter how much or what kind of discretion the statute grants. They have recently 
reaffirmed this stark view of the nondelegation doctrine in response to criticisms by Larry 
Alexander and Sai Prakash;5 their latest declaration is that “the standard nondelegation 
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1
   Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 
1723 (2002).
2 Id. at 1722.
3 See id. at 1723 (“[W]e agree that the Constitution bars the ‘delegation of legislative power.’  In our 
view, however, the content of that prohibition is the following: Neither Congress nor its members may 
delegate to anyone else the authority to vote on federal statutes or to exercise other de jure powers of 
federal legislators.”).
4 Id.
5 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1297 (2003).
2doctrine has no real pedigree in constitutional text and structure, in originalist 
understandings, or in judicial precedent; nor can plausible arguments from democratic 
theory or social welfare be marshaled to support it.”6
The recent exchange among Professors Alexander, Prakash, Posner, and 
Vermeule covers important and interesting issues ranging from the meaning of legislative 
power7 to the proper interpretation of John Locke’s pronouncements on delegation,8 but it 
does not engage the central constitutional question concerning delegation: does the 
Constitution in fact place limits on the kind and quantity of discretion that Congress may 
grant?  Alexander and Prakash “have sympathy for the conventional nondelegation 
doctrine,”9 but they make clear that they “have not sought to prove that the conventional 
nondelegation doctrine is the one enshrined in the Constitution.”10
I seek to prove it here.  I firmly resist Posner and Vermeule’s prescribed “course 
of therapy”11 -- which seems more like a lobotomy – for the law’s alleged nondelegation 
neurosis.  As far as the original meaning of the Constitution is concerned, the traditional 
nondelegation doctrine, while not always formulated by courts or scholars in the most 
6
   Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1331, 1331 
(2003).  Posner and Vermeule are not entirely alone in their criticism of the traditional nondelegation 
doctrine.  Kenneth Davis has long urged that the standard nondelegation doctrine is a judicial invention 
without constitutional foundation, see, e.g., 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6, at 66 (3d ed. 1994), and Justices Stevens and Souter have expressed 
similar views.  See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).
7 See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 5, at 1304-12; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1338-41.
8 See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 5, at 1320-23; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1339, 1342.
9
   Alexander & Prakash, supra note 5, at 1299.
10 Id. at 1238.
11
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1723.
3felicitous fashion and almost never applied properly by government actors, reflects a real 
principle embedded in the Constitution.  Just as paranoids can sometimes have enemies, 
neurotic legal systems can occasionally worry about real problems.  It is a genuine 
constitutional problem if Congress grants improper discretion to other actors.
This article demonstrates that the traditional nondelegation doctrine, at least in its 
most general guise, has a solid constitutional grounding.  To be sure, I do not defend the 
dominant modern formulation of that doctrine that regards an “intelligible principle”12 as 
the touchstone for a constitutional grant of discretion.  Still less do I defend modern 
applications of the doctrine, which effectively treat it as a nullity.13  I have elsewhere 
described at length the precise version of the nondelegation principle that I think is 
contained in the Constitution.14  As aptly formulated by Chief Justice Marshall nearly two 
hundred years ago, the nondelegation doctrine distinguishes “those important subjects, 
which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in 
which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under 
such general provisions to fill up the details.”15  Or, as I have restated (without 
necessarily improving upon) Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation , “[i]n every case, 
Congress must make the central, fundamental decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary 
12
   J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
13 See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding as constitutional a 
grant of authority to the Environmental Protection Agency to set air quality standards that are “requisite to 
protect the public health,” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000)).
14 See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327 (2002).  Needless to say, this 
effort was not well received by the therapeutic community.  See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 
1728 n.20, 1730, 1736 n.61.
15
   Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (emphasis added).
4matters to the President or the courts.”16  But the precise formulation of the delegation 
principle is not critical to this article.  My point here is only that the Constitution contains 
some limitation on the extent to which Congress can grant discretion to other actors; that 
abstract principle is what I describe as the “traditional nondelegation doctrine.”  Once the 
principle is established, we can always, as the old joke goes, haggle over the price.
Accordingly, this article explains in detail how  statutes vesting undue discretion 
in executive (or any other) actors exceed Congress’s enumerated power under the 
Sweeping Clause of Article I,17 because laws vesting excessive discretion in the 
executive (or in any other actor)18 are not “necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” federal powers.  Such laws are either not necessary, not proper, or both.  They 
are not “necessary” when they fail to have, as James Madison put it, an “obvious and 
precise affinity”19 with whatever federal power they seek to execute.  Even when such 
laws are “necessary,” they are not “proper” when they charge the President with 
16
   Lawson, supra note 14, at 376-77.  Both formulations, of course, sound absurdly circular.  They are in 
fact circular, but not absurdly so.
One can try to find alternative ways to express the distinction between fundamental and ancillary 
matters, such as focusing on case-resolving power or demonstration of political commitment or 
choices among salient alternatives, but in the end, one cannot really get behind or beneath the fact 
that law execution and application involve discretion in matters of “less interest” but turn into 
legislation when that discretion extends to “important subjects.”  That is the line that the 
Constitution draws, and there is no escape from it.
Id. at 377.
17 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in 
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).  Although it has become 
conventional in modern times to call this clause the “Necessary and Proper Clause,” the founding 
generation uniformly called it the Sweeping Clause.  If it was good enough for them, it’s good enough for 
me.
18
   For ease of exposition, I will henceforth speak only of discretion vested in the President.  The same 
arguments developed here, however, apply to discretion vested in courts or other actors.
19
   Letter of Sept. 2, 1819 to Spencer Roane, in 8 The Writings of James Madison 447, 448 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., 1908).
5excessive discretion.  The essence of the executive power is “the execution of validly 
enacted law,”20 but a law that exceeds Congress’s power under the Sweeping Clause is 
not “validly enacted” and therefore does not count as “law” that the President may 
permissibly execute.  That is what the traditional nondelegation doctrine rests upon , and 
it is right.
Along the way, I will make a number of observations about Posner and 
Vermeule’s interpretative methodology, which in many respects seriously 
misunderstands originalism.  To be sure, some of these observations are more than a bit 
unfair to Posner and Vermeule.  Originalists are creatures that come in many different 
shapes and sizes – and those shapes and sizes are often fuzzy and shifting.  Accordingly, 
it is understandable that Posner and Vermeule would cast a broad net to catch as many of 
these elusive and chameleonic creatures as they can.  Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable 
to to ask them to tailor their tools and traps a bit more precisely to the different species 
that they are hunting.
As anyone remotely familiar with my work can attest, I would not dream of 
criticizing Posner and Vermeule, or anyone else, for challenging entrenched, traditional 
understandings.  The fact that a view is traditional does not make it right.  But, 
occasionally, conventional wisdom is conventional precisely because it is wisdom.  The 
nondelegation doctrine represents conventional wisdom in this sense.
I.  Where Do We Start?: An Interpretative Introduction
20
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1730. 
6To use an example of which I have become inordinately fond,21 suppose that 
Congress passes the Goodness and Niceness Act of 2004.  Section 1 of the statute 
outlaws all transactions involving interstate or foreign commerce that do not promote 
goodness and niceness.  Section 2 of the statute provides that the President shall define 
the content of this statute by promulgating regulations to promote goodness and niceness 
in all matters involving commerce and shall specify penalties for violations of those 
regulations.  As far as Posner and Vermeule are concerned, this statute seems perfectly 
constitutional.  It does not grant to the President, or anyone else, the power to vote on 
legislation.  It gives the President a specific, if open-ended, instruction; and to the extent 
that the President follows the instruction by promulgating goodness and niceness 
regulations, he22 would appear simply to be exercising the “executive Power”23 to carry 
into effect legislative enactments.  If Congress is exercising its legislative power by 
enacting a statute and the President is exercising his executive power by obeying it, 
what’s the problem?  What, if anything, in the Constitution says that Congress cannot 
enact such a statute?
That is the wrong question.  The right question is: what, if anything, in the 
Constitution says that Congress can enact such a statute?  Congress, as with all federal 
institutions, can only exercise those powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.  That is 
what the principle of enumerated powers means.
21 See Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 49-50 (3d ed. 2004); Gary Lawson, The Rise and 
Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1239 (1994).
22
   The Constitution uses a generic male pronoun for the President.   See e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  
I follow that practice without endorsing it.
23 Id. art. II, § 1.
7The second section of the Goodness and Niceness Act, which instructs the 
President to define the content of the first section, is not authorized by the Commerce 
Clause.24  That clause empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”25  The statutory 
provision authorizing presidential regulations does not regulate commerce.  It does not 
(unlike the first section of the hypothetical statute) command or forbid any conduct.  
Instead, it identifies a person who is authorized to command or forbid – i.e., regulate –
conduct.  The only power conferred by the Commerce Clause is the power to regulate, 
and a statute that identifies a regulator of conduct does not itself regulate.  That does not 
mean, of course, that the statute is unconstitutional.  It simply means that constitutional 
authorization for the statute must be found somewhere other than in the Commerce 
Clause.
The obvious place to look for constitutional authorization is the Sweeping Clause, 
which provides that Congress may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [identified in Article I, section 8], and 
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.”26 Perhaps the second section of the Goodness and 
Niceness Act is permissible because it helps “carry[] into Execution” the commerce 
power that Congress has exercised in the first section.
24
   Is the first section authorized by the Commerce Clause?  Only if there is no real content to the term 
“regulate.”  Even then, the law could not constitutionally be enforced unless the enforcement provisions are 
authorized by the Sweeping Clause.  But that is all beside the point here.
25 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
26 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
8The Sweeping Clause, however, does not authorize all laws that help carry into 
execution federal powers.  It only authorizes laws that are “necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” those powers.  Is the section of the Goodness and Niceness Act 
that authorizes the President to define goodness and niceness “necessary and proper” for 
carrying into execution the commerce power?
I seek to answer that question by reference to the Constitution’s original meaning.  
There are, of course, plenty of other ways in which one can try to answer it, but they do 
not concern me here.  Posner and Vermeule have sought to ground at least part of their 
case in terms of original meaning, and that is the only part that I am addressing.27
In order to search for original meaning, one must know for what one is searching.  
A number of originalists, and a somewhat larger number of non-originalists, often treat 
the search for original meaning as though it was a quest for the subjective mental states of 
some group of framers, ratifiers, or citizens.  I do not.  Properly understood, original 
meaning is a hypothetical rather than historical mental state. The ultimate question of 
original meaning is: “What would a fully informed public audience at the relevant 
[original] point in time, in possession of all relevant information about the Constitution 
and the world around it, have understood the Constitution to mean?”28 Such an approach 
27
   Accordingly, I have no comment on Posner and Vermeule’s policy arguments against a nondelegation 
principle, nor do I care to engage them at length about the proper reading of precedents – although I will 
gratuitously offer that their treatment of Chief Justice Marshall’s sophisticated reasoning in Wayman v. 
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), is particularly problematic.  Cf. Lawson, supra note 14, at 355-61 
(reading the case correctly) with Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1738-39 (doing otherwise).
28 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American 
Legal History 9 (2004).
9“best captures the real nature of argumentation concerning documentary meaning.”29
Both in the eighteenth century and today,
people give reasons for their views of meaning, and those reasons do not 
inevitably reduce to some method for adding actual mental states.  Those reasons 
can involve pointing out some feature of the document that one’s opponents have 
not yet seen, or have undervalued, or have refused to acknowledge for political or 
other reasons.  In other words, they refer to mental states that would or might exist 
under counterfactual circumstances.  Those reasons can also, of course, include 
reference to actual mental states; one can certainly invoke the numbers, the 
eminence, or both of the proponents of a particular viewpoint.  But those actual 
mental states are evidence of meaning; they are not constitutive of meaning.  That 
is how dissenting voices on meaning can maintain, without absurdity, that they 
are right and the majority is wrong.  And majorities typically do not consider it a 
full and complete response to any arguments about meaning to point out that the 
dissenting voices are not as loud as the majority’s.30
In order to distinguish this species of originalism from other variants, one should perhaps 
call it something like “reasonable-observer originalism.”31
Operationally, the difference between reasonable-observer originalism and 
“intentionalist” approaches concerns the weight that is properly given to pieces of 
evidence rather than the admissibility of that evidence.  Reasonable- observer originalism 
focuses on what a fully-informed, unbiased observer would have concluded after 
weighing all relevant evidence.  The expressed views of concrete historical individuals 
can provide modest evidence of what a reasonable observer would have concluded, but 
they are hardly the touchstone of an inquiry into meaning.  Actual participants in actual 
debates were not always in possession of all relevant information, were not always 
unbiased observers, and were not always (given the real-world stakes involved) 
29 Id.
30 Id. at 10.
31
   For a more extended discussion of this approach, see id. at 7-12; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, -- Geo. L.J. – (2004) 
(forthcoming) .
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necessarily honest about their own thoughts or their perceptions of the thoughts of others.  
This is true of all forms of expressed views, including statements or actions of framers or 
ratifiers, statements or actions of legislators or executive officials, and statements or 
actions of judges.  Precedents, whether testimonial, legislative, or judicial, are relatively 
weak evidence of original meaning.  Such evidence generally pales before evidence 
drawn from text, structure, interpretative conventions, and general background 
understandings about language, the document in question, and the world in which the 
document is embedded.
For intentionalist originalists, direct statements or actions of concrete historical 
individuals are very persuasive evidence of original meaning.  The same is true for 
“Burkean” or “traditionalist” originalists, who see practices, and especially founding-era 
practices, as good evidence of original meaning.  For such interpreters, materials such as 
“the records of the constitutional convention, the ratification debates, The Federalist, and 
early governmental practice”32 may well be, as Posner and Vermeule describe them, “the 
canonical originalist sources.”33 For reasonable-observer originalists such as myself, 
however, such sources carry a lot of baggage relative to their probative value. To us, 
“arguments from structure and ‘first principles’ can easily outweigh even very impressive 
evidence about concrete historical understandings.  Original understandings were not 
necessarily original meanings.”34
32
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1733.
33 Id.
34 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 28, at 12.
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Given this methodology, the task is to figure out what the words “necessary and 
proper,” as they appear in the Sweeping Clause, would have meant to a fully-informed 
reasonable observer of the Constitution in 1788.
At least one thing is very clear: The words would have meant something.  They 
are not ciphers or embellishments.  The Sweeping Clause does not say or mean that 
Congress may employ any means whatsoever to implement valid legislative ends.  Nor 
does it say that Congress’s discretion is the sole judge of the necessity and propriety of 
executory laws.  There are clauses in the Constitution that actually say that sort of thing,35
but the Sweeping Clause, which refers to laws that objectively “shall be necessary and 
proper,” is not one of them. The central question with respect to the nondelegation 
doctrine is therefore: can laws conferring discretion on executive actors ever fail to be 
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers?
Before we answer this question, one further methodological point bears mention.
Posner and Vermeule insist that proponents of the nondelegation doctrine bear the burden 
of showing “that the Constitution contains some implicit principle that constrains the 
permissible scope or precision of otherwise valid statutory grants.”36  This burden is 
heavy, they claim, because it must overcome the inference against implied limitations on 
congressional powers generated by the express limitations contained in Article I, section 
35 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Congress may “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, 
as they think proper, in the President . . . , the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments”) (emphasis 
added).  For other examples, and a detailed contrast of those provisions with the objective requirements of 
the Sweeping Clause, see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation  of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 276-85 (1993).
36
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728-29.
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9.37 They have matters exactly backwards.  Under the principle of enumerated powers, 
all exercises of federal power must affirmatively be grounded in a constitutional 
enumeration that authorizes the actor or institution in question to perform the relevant act.  
Only if such an authorization can be found do we then ask whether anything in the 
Constitution affirmatively prohibits the otherwise-authorized exercise of power.  Grants 
of discretion by Congress must find affirmative authorization in some constitutional 
source.  If that source is the Sweeping Clause, as it normally must be, then the burden is 
on the proponent of federal power to prove, affirmatively, that such laws are “necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution” some federal power.38  The requirement in the 
Sweeping Clause that laws be “necessary and proper” is not a limitation, implied or 
otherwise, on congressional power.  It is part of the affirmative grant of power contained 
in the Sweeping Clause; the phrase “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” is 
part of the definition of the specific enumerated power in Article I, section 8, clause 18.
The burden of proof is accordingly on advocates of limitless grants of discretion to show 
that such grants are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” federal power.
II.  Grants of Discretion Are Not Always “Necessary”
The meaning of the word “necessary” in the Sweeping Clause has been often 
plumbed.  The term clearly describes some kind of causal connection between means and 
37 See id. at 1729 (“Article I, § 9 crafts an elaborate set of express restrictions, such as the ex post facto 
and bill of attainder clauses, suggesting by negative implication that no other limitations should be 
recognized.”).
38
   For a modest defense, or rather an introduction to a defense, of the proposition that the initial burden of 
proof is always on the proponent of federal power, see Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and 
Cure, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 411, 425-27 (1996).
13
ends: a statute is “necessary” as a means for carrying into execution federal power if it 
bears a certain causal – or, as David Engdahl has termed it, a “telic”39 -- connection to the 
achievement of that end. There has been much debate since the time of the founding 
concerning the tightness of the required causal connection.  Some founding era figures
such as Thomas Jefferson believed that laws under the Sweeping Clause were 
“necessary” only if they were “means without which the grant of the power would be 
nugatory.”40  Others such as Alexander Hamilton, as reflected in the preamble to the bill 
for the first Bank of the United States, maintained that a law was “necessary” if it “might 
be conceived to be conducive” to achieving legislative ends,41 which calls to mind so-
called “rational basis” scrutiny in modern equal protection doctrine.42  Still others such as 
James Madison thought that the word “necessary” as used in the Sweeping Clause 
required something in between these two extremes; Madison described the word as 
requiring “a definite connection between means and ends” in which the executory law 
and the executed power are linked “by some obvious and precise affinity.”43
39 David E. Engdahl, Constitutional Federalism in a Nutshell 20 (2d ed. 1987).
40
   Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank, in 19 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 275, 278 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).
41
   1 Annals of Cong. 1948 (1791) (statement of James Madison quoting the preamble to the first Bank 
Bill).
42 See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992) (“the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so 
long as . . . the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction 
arbitrary or irrational.”).
43
   Letter of Sept. 2, 1819 to Spencer Roane, in 8 The Writings of James Madison 447, 448 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., 1908).
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At a very basic level, any debate about the strength of the required causal 
connection is largely beside the point for present purposes.44 Posner and Vermeule 
maintain that there is no case even in principle in which a law that does not transfer 
formal voting authority to a non-congressional actor is unconstitutional because of the 
kind or quantity of discretion that it confers.  If there is even one instance in which a law 
delegating discretion to the President would, because of the kind or nature of the 
discretion involved, not be “necessary . . . for carrying into Execution” federal powers, 
the Posner/Vermeule position is wrong.  Posner and Vermeule accordingly must say that 
the word “necessary” is literally meaningless – that there is no logically possible 
circumstance in which a grant of discretion can fail to meet the causal requirement 
embodied by the word.  That is wrong even if one accepts the “rational basis” approach 
of Hamilton.  Under the Hamiltonian standard, it may be extremely unlikely that a statute 
vesting discretion in the President will ever fail the test of necessity under the Sweeping 
Clause, and it may be even more unlikely that a court will enforce whatever restrictions 
the Constitution imposes, but the restrictions will still exist in principle.  That is precisely 
what Posner and Vermeule deny.
Posner and Vermeule could, of course, claim a kind of moral victory by arguing 
that I have not described a “delegation” problem at all, but have instead described a “lack 
of congressional authority” problem.  Whatever.  The basic idea is that the Constitution 
places some limits on the extent to which Congress can vest discretion in the President.  
Traditionally, that idea has gone under the label of “nondelegation.”  It could just as well 
go under the label of “exceeding Congress’s authority under the Sweeping Clause,” 
44
   For a thorough treatment of the founding-era debate over necessity, see Randy E. Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Penn. J. Const. L. 183, 188-203 (2003).
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reserving the “nondelegation” label only for formal transfers of voting authority.  I will 
willingly grant Posner and Vermeule an academic trademark in the label “nondelegation” 
if they will grant the existence of the constitutional principle that I describe.  I doubt 
whether they will take the bargain; Posner and Vermeule do not appear to be arguing 
about labels.  They want to say that the Constitution does not limit the power of Congress 
to vest discretion in other actors.
But let us not draw conclusions too hastily about the effect of the necessity 
requirement on the nondelegation doc trine (or, if one prefers, the Congress-cannot-vest-
too-much-discretion-in-the-President-under-the-Sweeping-Clause doctrine).  If the strong 
Hamiltonian take on the word “necessary” in the Sweeping Clause is correct, Posner and 
Vermeule might still be in the game, at least as a practical matter.  They are, after all, 
clever people, and clever people can surely gin up causal connections that will sustain 
even the most ridiculous statutes.  Courts do it routinely.45  I will even help them out in 
the case of the Goodness and Niceness Act: The statute delegating all practical 
decisionmaking power to the President may well fail the laugh test as a “necessary” 
means for carrying into execution the commerce power, but suppose that Congress 
explains that the purpose of section 2 of the Goodness and Niceness Act is to relieve 
Congress of the need to spend time on the specifics of commercial regulations so that it 
can concentrate its limited energy on other matters, such as designating the precise paths 
of postal routes.46  Section 2 of the Act, in other words, would be justified as “necessary” 
45 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (finding an effect on interstate commerce 
in a prohibition on local loan-sharking); Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (finding an 
effect on interstate commerce from the consumption of home-grown wheat).
46
   The first post road established by statute was:
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for carrying into execution the postal power47 and the commerce power considered as a 
pair.  After all, the Sweeping Clause authorizes laws that carry into execution any powers 
granted by the Constitution; nothing in the Clause says that each executory law must 
uniquely map onto one and only one enumerated power.  If the telic connection required 
by the word “necessary” is loose enough, there may be literally no cases in which grants 
of discretion, however broad, would fail the test of necessity.  The word “necessary” in 
the Sweeping Clause only poses a serious threat to the Posner/Vermeule thesis if it 
requires a substantial enough causal connection between means and ends to have serious 
bite.
It does.  As an original matter, the “rational basis” standard of Hamilton has no 
constitutional foundation.  The textual case against the Hamiltonian rational basis 
interpretation is simply devastating.  Textually, it is linguistically bizarre to read the word 
“necessary” to mean anything like “rationally related to.”  Samuel Johnson’s 1785 
Dictionary of the English Language defined “necessary” as “1.  Needful; indispensably 
requisite.  2.  Not free; fatal; impelled by fate.  3.  Conclusive; decisive by inevitable 
consequence.”48  This is not the stuff of which rational basis standards are made.49
From Wisscassett in the district of Maine, to Savannah in Georgia, by the following route, to wit: 
Portland, Portsmouth, Newburyport, Ipswich, Salem, Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Hartford, 
Middletown, New Haven, Stratford, Fairfield, Norwalk, Stamford, New York, Newark, 
Elizabethtown, Woodbridge, Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, Bristol, Philadelphia, Chester, 
Wilmington, Elkton, Charlestown, Havre de Grace, Hartford, Baltimore, Bladensburg, 
Georgetown, Alexandria, Colchester, Dumfries, Fredericksburg, Bowling Green, Hanover Court 
House, Richmond, Petersburg, Halifax, Tarborough, Smithfield, Fayetteville, Newbridge over 
Drowning creek, Cheraw Court House, Camden, Statesburg, Columbia, Cambridge and Augusta; 
and from thence to Savannah * * *.
Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232.
47 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (granting Congress power “[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads”).
48 See Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (1785).
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Moreover, when the Constitution means to give actors unfettered discretion with respect 
to means and ends, it knows how to do so.50  The words “shall be” that precede 
“necessary” in the Sweeping Clause hammer home the idea that the clause means to grant 
only a limited power.
Intratextual evidence is (if this is possible) even more devastating to the 
Hamiltonian position.  Consider the Constitution’s uses of the words “necessary” and 
“needful.”  Samuel Johnson’s 1785 dictionary cross-defined “necessary” and “needful” 
as synonyms: one of Johnson’s definitions of “necessary” was “needful,” and Johnson’s 
entire definition of  “needful” was simply “necessary; indispensably requisite.”  On two 
separate occasions, including in the clause immediately preceding the Sweeping Clause, 
the Constitution uses the term “needful” to define Congress’s powers: The District and 
Enclaves Clause gives Congress power of exclusive legislation over all land acquired 
from States “for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other 
needful Buildings,”51 and the Territory and Property Clause authorizes Congress to make 
“all needful Rules and Regulations respecting” federal territory or property.52  Both 
usages of “needful” involve contexts – federal enclaves, territory, and property – in 
49
   Hamilton’s famous observation that “[i]t is a common mode of expression to say, that it is necessary for 
a government or a person to do this or that thing, when nothing more is intended or understood, than that 
the interests of the government or person require, or will be promoted by, the doing of this or that thing,” 
Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton
97, 102 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke, eds. 1965), appears to be blather.  I am not an historian, so I 
cannot claim extensive familiarity with eighteenth-century discourse.  But I have examined every usage of 
the word “necessary” prior to or contemporaneous with Hamilton’s comment that appears in the 
(considerable) database contained on the American Freedom Library CD-ROM, and none of those usages 
even remotely conform to Hamilton’s.  Samuel Johnson would, unsurprisingly, appear to have much the 
better of this particular argument.
50 See supra note 35.
51 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
52 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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which Congress acts with the powers of a general government and is not limited by the 
enumerations of subject matter jurisdiction in Article I, section 8.53  If  there was ever 
going to be occasion for giving terms such as “needful” or “necessary” a relatively loose 
construction, it would be when describing the legislative powers of a general government 
rather than when describing the legislative powers of a limited government.  The 
Constitution appears to use “needful” when describing a less demanding means-ends 
requirement and “necessary” when describing a stricter one.
There are, of course, also intratextual reasons to reject Jefferson’s extreme view 
of necessity, notwithstanding its strong linguistic pedigree.  Chief Justice Marshall in 
McCulloch v. Maryland54 famously highlighted the Imposts Clause, which provides that 
“[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on 
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection 
laws . . . .”55  As Marshall cogently argued in McCulloch,56 if “necessary” alone already 
means something like “indispensable,” as Jefferson and the counsel for the State of 
Maryland in McCulloch insisted,57 what sense does it make to add the qualifier 
“absolutely” to the term?  If the Constitution uses “absolutely necessary” to mean 
“indispensable,” the bare word “necessary” must mean something less.
53 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 
(1890) (Congress has “general and plenary” power over federal territories). 
54
   17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
55 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
56 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414-15.
57 See id. 367 (argument of Mr. Jones) (defining “necessary” as “indispensably requisite”).
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That is all correct.  The big question, however, is how much less than 
“indispensable” the word “necessary” means.  Hamilton is not the only alternative to 
Jefferson.  The textual and intratextual evidence in favor of a strict interpretation of the 
word “necessary” does not simply dissolve in the face of the Imposts Clause; it merely
stops somewhere short of where Jefferson would have liked to see it.  If one is to take the 
Constitution seriously, the task is to find an understanding of the word “necessary” in the 
Sweeping Clause that reflects the linguistic and structural evidence that points towards 
strict indispensability but that also takes account of the intratextual evidence that sets an 
upper bound on the tightness of the means-end connection that can plausibly be attributed 
to the Sweeping Clause.
James Madison found as good a solution to that puzzle as one will find.58
Madison shared the concerns of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch about taking too 
stringent a view of necessity, though he grounded his concerns in prudence rather than 
intratextual analysis.  In his 1791 remarks in Congress opposing the first Bank of the 
United States, Madison expressly rejected Jefferson’s view of the Sweeping Clause.  The 
reporter described Madison’s position thusly:59
Those two words [“necessary” and “proper”] had been, by some, taken in 
a very limited sense, and were thought only to extend to the passing of such laws 
as were indispensably necessary to the very existence of the government.  He 
[Madison] was disposed to think that a more liberal construction should be put on 
58
   It is hopefully evident that I do not invoke Madison as an authority, but simply as a very smart person 
who happened to have the right answer to this question.
59
   The accuracy of early reports of debates in Congress is subject to serious question.  See James H. 
Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 
(1986).  The views of the Sweeping Clause attributed to Madison in the Bank Bill debate, however, cohere 
with other, more reliably-related views.
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them . . . for very few acts of the legislature could be proved essentially necessary 
to the absolute existence of government.60
At the same time, Madison warned against too generous a reading of the means-ends 
requirement for executory laws:
The essential characteristic of the government, as composed of limited and 
enumerated powers, would be destroyed: If instead of direct and incidental
means, any means could be used, which in the language of the preamble to the 
bill, “might be conceived to be conducive to the successful conducting of the 
finances; or might be conceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of 
loans.”61
How does one navigate between the Scylla of Jeffersonian indispensability and the 
Charybdis of Hamiltonian rational basis review?
Three decades later, Madison had the answer.  “There is,” he said in a letter to 
Spencer Roane in the aftermath of McCulloch, “certainly a reasonable medium between 
expounding the Constitution with the strictness of a penal law, or other ordinary statute, 
and expounding it with a laxity which may vary its essential character . . . .”62  That 
reasonable medium, in the context of the Sweeping Clause, is to require of executory 
laws “a definite connection between means and ends,”63 in which the executory law and 
the executed power are linked “by some obvious and precise affinity.”64
This standard captures, as well as words can capture it, the nature of the causal 
connection between legislative means and ends prescribed by the Sweeping Clause.  
60
   4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 417 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates] .
61
   1 Annals of Cong. 1947-48 (emphasis added).
62
   Letter of Sept. 2, 1819 to Spencer Roane, in 8 The Writings of James Madison 447, 451-52 (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., 1908).
63 Id. at 448.
64 Id.
21
Textually, Madison’s formulation conforms to the ordinary meaning of the word 
“necessary,” which is not a term that one would likely use to describe remote and 
attentuated connections.  Structurally, it makes sense of the other uses of the word 
“necessary” in the Constitution.  Under a Madisonian view of “necessary,” the phrase 
“absolutely necessary” in the Imposts Clause of Article I, section 10 means that without 
congressional consent, States can only tax imports or exports if their inspection laws 
would otherwise be unenforceable.  That is a sensible, and even obvious, interpretation of 
the Imposts Clause: it reads the qualifier “absolutely” to amplify but not fundamentally to 
alter the meaning of “necessary.”65 The word “necessary” also appears in the 
Recommendation Clause of Article II, which says that the President “shall from time to 
time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their 
Consideration, such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”66 Given that 
any laws ultimately enacted under the Sweeping Clause must be “necessary,” the 
Madisonian understanding of “necessary” is an excellent fit with the Recommendation 
Clause as well.
If anything remotely resembling Madison’s view of the means-ends requirement 
imposed by the Sweeping Clause is correct, the nondelegation doctrine is very much alive 
and kicking.  If Congress wants to vest discretion in the President, Congress had better be 
prepared to show in a direct and immediate fashion how the precise scope and character 
65
   Consider how the Imposts Clause reads if one plugs in a Hamiltonian understanding of necessity: “No 
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except 
what may be absolutely conceivably conducive.”  Not.
66 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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of that discretion is important to the execution of federal powers.67  Sometimes Congress 
will succeed.  Sometimes Congress will fail.  It is hard to imagine, for instance, a 
plausible argument, under a Madisonian view, for the necessity of section 2 of the 
Goodness and Niceness Act.  And any failure is enough to defeat Posner and Vermeule’s 
position.
Modern constitutional law, needless to say, does not reflect Madison’s view of the 
Sweeping Clause.68  But modern constitutional law bungles almost everything that it 
touches.  The Constitution’s original meaning is what it is, regardless of what courts, past 
or present, do or do not say about it.  Madison’s understanding of the word “necessary” in 
the Sweeping Clause makes constitutional sense and other proferred understandings do 
not.  That is the end of the matter with respect to original meaning, and it is also the end 
of the matter with respect to Posner and Vermeule’s theory of nondelegation.
As I have already observed, however, Posner and Vermeule are clever people.  It 
would not be astonishing if they found a plausible-sounding end run around even 
Madison’s view of necessity.  After all, the Madisonian standard is a standard rather than 
a rule, and standards are notoriously malleable.  It would be much more satisfying if there 
was another route besides necessity for challenging the constitutionality of congressional 
67
   It is tempting to try to relate the views of Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton to the tiers of modern equal 
protection scrutiny, with Jefferson representing strict scrutiny, Madison representing intermediate scrutiny, 
and Hamilton representing rational basis scrutiny.  But that is a story for another day.
68
   It is more equivocal whether McCulloch did so.  Madison obviously thought that McCulloch was 
wrongly decided, but Madison may have misapplied his own standard.  McCulloch clearly rejected the 
Jeffersonian view of necessity, but it is less clear what view it actually adopted.  Some passages in the 
opinion seem very Madisonian, see, e.g., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422-23, while others are distinctly 
Hamiltonian, see, e.g., id. at 413-14, 415.  The point is irrelevant for determining original meaning; the 
Marshall Court’s interest in the Constitution’s original meaning was tepid at best.
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grants of discretion.  That route is the requirement under the Sweeping Clause that laws 
executing federal powers be not merely “necessary” but “necessary and proper.”
III.  Grants of Discretion Are Not Always “Proper”
A good percentage of my professional life has been devoted to the proposition 
that the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause imposes limitations on executory 
legislation different from and complementary to the limitations imposed by the word 
“necessary.”  The argument for this proposition was outlined in 1993 in an article co-
authored with Patricia B. Granger,69 and a decade later I applied it to explain why the 
nondelegation doctrine has a sound constitutional footing.70  The bottom-line conclusion 
is that a “proper” executory law must conform to “the ‘proper’ allocation of authority 
within the federal government ; . . . the ‘proper’ scope of the federal government’s 
limited jurisdiction with respect to the retained prerogatives of the states ; . . . and . . . the 
‘proper’ scope of the federal government’s limited jurisdiction with respect to the 
people’s retained rights.”71  Put as simply as possible, laws enacted under the Sweeping 
Clause “must be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of 
federalism, and individual rights.”72
69 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 35.  For those who wonder about such things: my co-author is now 
Patricia B.G. Lawson.  We were married just a few months before the article came out.  In this article, I 
continue to refer to her as Ms. Granger to avoid confusion.
70 See Lawson, supra note 14.
71
   Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 297.
72 Id.
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The best way to see how this understanding of the word “proper” relates to the 
nondelegation doctrine is to examine what Posner and Vermeule don’t like about it.  
They have two basic objections: that the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause is better 
understood as a redundancy rather than as a separate requirement and that even if the 
word “proper” does independent work, it cannot ground a nondelegation principle.  Both 
claims are wrong.  The word “proper” has independent meaning, and it precisely grounds 
the traditional nondelegation doctrine.
A.  “Necessary and Proper” means “Necessary” and “Proper”
If the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause adds nothing to the word 
“necessary,” it obviously cannot serve as an independent source for a nondelegation 
doctrine; whatever limitations the word “necessary” imposes on grants of discretion 
would exhaust the substantive effect of the Sweeping Clause.  That is what Posner and 
Vermeule maintain.  According to them,
Lawson’s premise rests on an idiosyncratic reading of the [Sweeping] Clause, one 
which holds that the single word “proper” incorporates structural principles of 
separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights as limits on Congress’s 
affirmative authority . . . .  A more plausible reading because a less dramatic one, 
is just that the phrase “necessary and proper” is an example, among many in the 
Constitution, of an internally redundant phrase.  Consider other instances in 
Article I, § 8, such as “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” (cl 1), “Government 
and Regulation” (cl 14), or “organizing, arming and disciplining (cl 16).  On this 
view, “proper” just means “appropriate,” reinforcing the Supreme Court’s 
longstanding and capacious interpretation of the companion word “necessary” as 
meaning “useful” or “conducive to.”73
73
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.
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In prior work, Ms. Granger and I spent a fair amount of time and energy 
demonstrating that the words “necessary” and “proper” in the Sweeping Clause are not 
redundant.  We devoted, not one, but two subsections in our article to that specific 
proposition.74 Most of the rest of our article implicitly explained how textual, 
intratextual, structural, and historical considerations all support the view that “necessary” 
and “proper” are distinct terms.  The case for our position, however, is actually much
stronger than we let on, as the ensuing amplification will demonstrate.
The case begins, very modestly and quietly, with the venerable maxim that one 
ought to try to give each word in a legal instrument some meaning.  A construction that 
renders a word meaningless or irrelevant should be disfavored.75  As Posner and 
Vermeule correctly point out, it is easy to make too much of this maxim.  Lawyers love 
redundancy (as anyone who has ever read a contract or deed provision along the lines of 
“give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey” can attest),76 and the Constitution was written 
largely by lawyers.  Although Posner and Vermeule picked really, really bad examples to 
illustrate the Constitution’s willingness to indulge redundancy,77 there is in fact a 
significant number of places in which the Constitution – for reasons of caution, emphasis, 
or carelessness – contains duplicative provisions.  For instance, at least some of the 
74 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 275 (“B.  ‘Necessary’ and ‘Proper’ Are Distinct 
Requirements”); id. at 289 (“B. ‘Necessary’ As Distinct From ‘Proper’ ”).
75
   For the founding-era pedigree of this principle, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 564 (2003).
76 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 120 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77 See infra XX.
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various specifically enumerated Article I powers to prescribe punishments78 are surely 
duplicative of the general power to prescribe punishment granted by the Sweeping 
Clause.  Many of the provisions in sections 2 and 3 of Article II, such as the Commander-
in-Chief Clause79 and the Opinions Clause,80 replicate and clarify powers conferred on 
the President by the Article II Vesting Clause.81  And as I have vigorously argued 
elsewhere, the Bill of Rights was largely redundant given the original Constitution’s 
scheme of enumerated powers.82 Arguments from redundancy must be made with care.
But that does not mean that they cannot be made at all.  It simply means that they 
must be made with care.  For a number of reasons, a limited  argument from redundancy 
makes a good measure of sense in the specific context of the Sweeping Clause.
First, it is easier to find redundancy in the Constitution among provisions than 
among words.  The Constitution seems more willing to replicate powers or limitations for 
emphasis or clarity than to replicate specific terms within a provision.  That is not 
surprising.  In a Constitution driven by a skeptical view of human nature, and of political 
actors in particular,83 one should expect to see provisions layered over themselves in an 
78 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (authorizing Congress “[t]o provide for the Punishment of 
counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States”).
79 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”).
80 Id. (“he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices”).
81 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”).  See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 28, at 46-47 (discussing the superfluity of the 
Commander-in-Chief and Opinions Clauses).
82 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 28, at 189; Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights As an Exclamation 
Point, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511 (1999).
83
   For a brief discussion of the view of human nature reflected in the Constitution, see Steven G. Calabresi 
& Gary Lawson, Foreword: Two Visions of the Nature of Man, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (1993).
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effort to anticipate and avoid potential problems.  It is not impossible for the same 
considerations to affect the language within specific clauses, but that is a less direct way 
to confront risks of interpretative error than is the construction of “back-up systems” 
through redundant provisions.
The efforts of Posner and Vermeule to find examples of linguistic redundancy 
within Article I provide a good illustration of this general constitutional tendency to 
prefer redundancy of provisions over redundancy of terms.    Posner and Vermeule 
cavalierly proclaim as redundant the language in the Taxing Clause authorizing Congress 
to lay and collect “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”84 As Jeffrey Renz has ably 
demonstrated, however, the distinction among these different forms of revenue measures 
was actually enormously significant to the founding generation, reflecting a basic 
distinction between revenue measures and regulatory tools.85  It is especially odd to treat 
the phrase “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” as redundant when the Taxing Clause 
itself distinguishes “Taxes” from “Duties, Imposts and Excises,”86 and the Constitution 
elsewhere separately treats “Duties and Imposts.”87  In fairness to Posner and Vermeule,88
Madison agreed with them at least in part; in an 1828 letter, Madison declared that “[t]he 
84 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
85 See Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the President’s Paramour): An Examination of the 
Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, 
33 John Marshall L. Rev. 81, 88-94 (1999).
86 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises [but not Taxes] shall be uniform 
throughout the United States”).
87 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
88
  My strong suspicion (not quite rising to the level of a mortal certainty) is that Posner and Vermeule, 
before announcing redundancy in the Taxing Clause, conducted an amount of research on founding-era 
understandings of various taxing devices that asymptotically approaches zero.  But I will be fair to them 
anyway, even though they have displayed no inclination to return the favor.
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term taxes, if standing alone , would certainly have included duties, imposts, and 
excises,”89 and the Constitution’s own usages of the various taxing terms are sometimes 
hard to fathom.  For the reasons documented by Professor Renz, however, Madison’s 
basic assertion that the term “Taxes” is necessarily all-encompassing seems clearly false, 
and a study of founding-era materials on taxation reveals persistent, even if often fuzzy, 
demarcations among duties, imposts, and excises,90 especially between imposts and 
excises.91 Strike one.
Posner and Vermeule are also much too eager to announce that the terms 
“organizing, arming, and disciplining” in the Militia Clause,92 all have the same meaning.
An eighteenth-century observer would have been startled to be told that granting 
Congress power over, say, the disciplining of the militia also granted Congress power 
over the militia’s structure, command, training, and equipment. At the Constitutional 
Convention, Rufus King explained that “by organizing, the committee meant, 
proportioning the officers and men – by arming, specifying the kind, size, and caliber of 
arms – and by disciplining , prescribing the manual exercise, evolutions, &c,”93 which is 
exactly what ordinary language would suggest is meant by the different terms. Strike 
two.
89 See Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell, Sept. 18, 1828, at
www.constitution.org/jm/18280918_cabell.htm.
90
     For a brief elaboration of the distinction between the various forms of taxation, see Joseph A. Story, 
A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States XX, at § 156 (1833).
91 See, e.g., 1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 60, at XX (statement of Luther Martin).
92 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
93
  5 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 60, at 344 (statement of Rufus King). See Brannon P. Denning, 
Palladium of Liberty? Causes and Consequences of the Federalization of State Militias in the Twentieth 
Century, 21 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 191, 202 (1997).
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Posner and Vermeule’s third pitch is the provison granting Congress power to 
make rules for “the Government and Regulation” of the military.94  This provision was 
incorporated into the Constitution, without any reported debate or subsequent discussion, 
directly from the Articles of Confederation.95  I frankly do not know whether 
“Government” and “Regulation” mean precisely the same thing in this context – and I 
venture to guess that Posner and Vermeule are equally clueless.  There is, however, some 
reason to think that the term “Regulation,” as it is used in the Constitution on more than 
one occasion, has a narrower meaning than “Government,”96 though persons better 
versed in the lore of military history than Posner, Vermeule, or I are better situated to sort 
this out.  Let’s give them a foul tip on this one and let the reader decide whether the 
catcher hung on.
The point is not that redundancy of terms in the Constitution, and in Article I in 
particular, is nonexistent or inconceivable.  Arguments from redundancy or surplusage 
should not be relied upon to excess.97  But they are a reasonable starting point for an 
inquiry into constitutional meaning, especially when the arguments pertain to redundancy 
of language within a clause rather than to redundancy of provisions across the 
Constitution as a whole.  The maxim that one should construe legal documents to avoid 
linguistic redundancy had some power for the founding generation, and Article I of the 
Constitution simply does not exhibit the kind of consistently carefree use of language that 
94 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
95 Arts. of Confed. art. IX, ¶ 4 (1777).
96 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 139-41 
(2001) (discussing the meaning of the term “regulate” in the Commerce Clause).
97 See Nelson, supra note 75, at 574-75 (noting Madison’s caution about using such rules of construction).
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Posner and Vermeule are much too eager to find.  Moreover, the maxim was the linchpin 
of Chief Justice Marshall’s rejection of the strict Jeffersonian meaning of “necessity” in 
McCulloch.  Without that maxim as applied to the Imposts Clause, the textual and 
intratextual evidence in favor of the strict Jeffersonian understanding of necessity is 
simply overwhelming.  Posner and Vermeule probably want to think twice before 
jettisoning this maxim too quickly.
The best understanding of the Constitution is that the use of different words
within a clause creates a presumption that the words have independent meaning.  One 
should not be startled to find that presumption overcome in particular cases – by, for 
instance, evidence of consistent linguistic usage that treats certain terms as synonymous 
or redundant.  But one ought to start an inquiry into the meaning of the Sweeping Clause 
with a presumption that the words “necessary” and “proper” have independent meaning.
There is no consistent pattern of usage that overcomes this initial presumption.  
There was in fact a fair number of founding-era figures, including such luminaries as 
Patrick Henry, James Monroe, and Daniel Webster, who either argued or assumed that 
the word “proper” added nothing to the Sweeping Clause.98 One of the nine definitions 
of “proper” provided by Samuel Johnson would linguistically sustain the claim that 
“necessary” and “proper” were essentially redundant.99 But the evidence demonstrates 
that this was not a standard usage that trumps the otherwise governing interpretative 
convention.  To the contrary, there are numerous instances, from the ratifiying 
98 See id. at 276 n.26 (identifying Henry’s and Monroe’s views); id. at 289 (identifying Webster’s view).
99 See Johnson, supra note 48 (definining “proper” as “1. Peculiar; not belonging to more; not common.  
2. Noting an individual.  3. One’s own.  It is joined with any of the possessives: as my proper, their proper.  
4.  Natural; original.  5. Fit; accommodated; adapted; suitable; qualified.  6. Exact; accurate; just.  7. Not 
figurative.  8. It seems in Shakespeare to signify, mere; pure.  9. Elegant; pretty.”).  The fifth definition 
seems to reflect the same idea of causal or telic connection as is represented by the word “necessary.”
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conventions through the first few decades under the Constitution, of people treating 
“necessary” and “proper” as distinct terms.100 Most of the definitions found in Johnson’s 
dictionary, including the first four, reflect a very different meaning than could plausibly 
be attributed to “necessary.”  That is more than enough evidence to sustain the 
presumption in favor of independent meaning.
Further examination of the Constitution confirms that “necessary” and “proper” 
most likely have independent meaning.  There are instances in which the Constitution 
uses the word “necessary” without further qualification.101  At other times, the 
Constitution uses the word “needful” without qualification.102  On one occasion, the 
Constitution qualifies the term “necessary” with the adjective “absolutely.”103 On another 
occasion, the Constitution conjoins “necessary” with “expedient.”104  The Sweeping 
Clause uses the phrase “necessary and proper.”  To an unbiased observer, this at least 
suggests that the different usages might be meant to convey different messages.  Perhaps 
on close examination that initial suspicion will dissolve, but the Constitution’s pattern of 
usage of “necessary” and similar terms should at least raise a flag that the pattern might 
have significance.  At a minimum, the pattern reinforces the presumption that should 
100 Id. at 289-90.
101 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (imposing a presentment requirement for “[e]very Order, Resolution, 
or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary”); id. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (stating that when the House must choose the President, “a Majority of all the States shall 
be necessary to a Choice”).
102 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (referring to “needful Buildings”); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (referring to “all 
needful Rules and Regulations”).
103 See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
104 See id. art. II, § 3 (stating that President shall recommend to Congress “such Measures as he shall 
judge necessary and expedient”).
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arise from the general interpretative maxim to try to give each word in a clause some 
meaning.
Posner and Vermeule offer two responses to this evidence that “necessary” and 
“proper” most likely have different meanings in the Sweeping Clause.  First, they dismiss 
the argument as “idiosyncratic.”105  Second, they claim that reading “necessary” and 
“proper” as redundant is “[a] more plausible reading because a less dramatic one.”106
Because the charge of idiosnycrasy is substantively empty (idiosyncratic 
arguments can be either right or wrong), I could easily let it pass.  But, of course, I won’t.  
A word of high praise such as “idiosyncratic” should be reserved only for positions that 
deserve it; and while I am proud to say that many of my positions, including some that 
involve applications of the Sweeping Clause, might well merit such a compliment,107 the 
simple view that the words “necessary” and “proper” have distinct meanings, and that the 
word “proper” incorporates some set of structural principles into the Sweeping Clause, is
downright banal.  That view has been specifically endorsed by a large assortment of 
scholars, including (and these are just the major scholars who I personally know will not 
be offended by being named) Randy Barnett, Steve Calabresi, Stephen Gardbaum, 
Richard Garnett, Mike Paulsen, and Sai Prakash.108  Less to the point for me, though 
105
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.
106 Id.  Yes, those are the only arguments that they made.
107 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 
18 Const. Comm. 191, 223-24 (2001) (claiming that the Federal Rules of Evidence are unconstitutional 
under the Sweeping Clause).
108 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 111, 145 (2003); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 587 
(1994); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism 74 Tex. L. Rev. 795, 814 (1996); 
Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1, 79 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis By Statute: May Congress Remove 
the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L. J. 1535, 1568 (2000); Saikrishna Prakash, The 
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perhaps more to the point for others, the position has been specifically endorsed by the 
Supreme Court on at least three occasions in recent years.109 As scary as the thought may 
be, I am actually the law on this point.  The Court’s most recent treatment of the question 
in Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina simply assumes, as settled law, that statutes 
enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause must be tested separately for both necessity and 
propriety.110
Of course, any or all of the people who agree with me at an abstract level might 
well roundly reject much of the specific content that I would attribute to the word 
“proper,” including the specific view that the word “proper” holds the key to the 
nondelegation doctrine.  The basic idea, however, that the word “proper” in the Sweeping 
Clause has something important to say for structural constitutionalism is now (and it 
pains me deeply to say this) blandly conventional.  This is hardly proof of the argument’s 
soundness.  But it does leave one wondering how and why the word  “idiosyncratic” 
cropped up in this context.
As for whether a reading is preferable if it is less “dramatic” than another: I have 
absolutely no idea what Posner and Vermeule are talking about.  If by “dramatic” they 
mean “contrary to settled law,” they need both to read the previous paragraph and to 
explain why drama of that character has any relevance for an argument concerning 
original meaning.  If by “dramatic” they mean “having consequences,” then I suppose
they are right that my reading of the word “proper” is more “dramatic” than theirs, 
Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 737.  Modesty forbids disclosing the full 
results of my latest WESTLAW search.
109 See Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina, 538 U.S. 456, -- (2003); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
732-33 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997).
110 See 538 U.S. at --.
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though I would be interested to hear them defend the proposition that, all else being 
equal, one ought to prefer whatever interpretations of the Constitution have the fewest 
consequences.
All things considered, an inquiry into the meaning of the Sweeping Clause should 
begin with an inclination to attribute different meanings to the words “necessary” and 
“proper.”  One must stand ready to abandon that inclination if the evidence so warrants, 
but the presumption should be in favor of a reading of “proper” that complements rather 
than replicates the reading of “necessary.”
B.  Laws That Grant Too Much Discretion Are Not “Proper”
It is one thing to say that the word “proper” most likely means something 
different than the word “necessary.”  It is another matter altogether to specify that 
meaning and to show that it bears on the nondelegation doctrine.
I have spent much of my career presenting and defending the view that a “proper” 
law under the Sweeping Clause must respect background principles of federalism, 
separation of powers, and individual rights.  Some aspects of that view have been 
subjected to detailed criticism.111  This is not the place to rehearse the entire argument for 
111 See J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev.
581, 636-48 (objecting to the use of the word “proper” to refer to limitations other than means-ends 
constraints); Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understanding, Modern 
Misreadings, 43 Vill. L. Rev. 17, 46-140 (1998) (objecting to using the word “proper” as a source of 
individual rather than structural rights).  I have elsewhere responded to McAffee, whose criticisms are 
largely (and wisely) targetted at the claimed implications of the Lawson/Granger interpretation of the 
Sweeping Clause for individual rights rather than for its implications for structural arguments.  See
Lawson, supra note 14, at 348-49.  Indeed, if I understand McAffee correctly, he is likely to be on my side 
of the present debate.  Beck’s argument, as with McAffee’s, relies too heavily on history and not heavily 
enough on structure and principles.  Statements from individuals during and after the founding era, on 
which Beck almost entirely focuses, establish the linguistic feasibility of the Lawson/Granger view of the 
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(as Ms. Granger and I chose to call it) a “jurisdictional” interpretation of the Sweeping 
Clause.112 One does not need to accept everything that I say about the Sweeping Clause 
– such as its implications for Ninth Amendment analysis113 or for congressional statutes 
regulating the judicial process114 – in order to see that the Sweeping Clause forbids 
excessive grants of discretion.  That turns out to be a relatively easy case.  Accordingly, 
the “short form” of the argument is sufficient for present purposes.115  Even the short-
form argument, however, must proceed in steps.  First, I demonstrate that the word 
“proper” requires laws under the Sweeping Clause to respect principles of federalism and 
separated powers.  Second, I show that this requirement extends further than a mere 
obligation not to violate express constitutional provisions.  Third, I show that the 
requirement extends even further than an obligation not to violate principles that are 
intratextually and structurally derivable from the rest of the Constitution.  Fourth, and 
finally, I show that, under either the second or third step, one of the principles that must 
be respected by a “proper” executory law is the principle against exessive grants of 
discretion.
1.  Propriety and Reasonableness
Sweeping Clause, but they are not the primary sources of evidence concerning the clause’s meaning.  The 
argument must play out in terms of textual, intratextual, and structural arguments, with historical data 
playing a decidedly supporting role.  I discuss Beck’s sole textual argument infra at XX. 
112
   As Beck points out, there is some ambiguity in that label, see Beck, supra note 111, at 636 n.364, but I 
have been unable to think of a better one.
113 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 326-30.
114 See Lawson, supra note 107.
115
   For the long version, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 297-326.
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If the word “proper” is to mean something different from the word “necessary,” it 
must refer to something other than the causal connection, or “fit,” between executory 
laws and executed powers.  If no such plausible meaning for “proper” is available, or if 
such a meaning is available in principle but evidence of original meaning does not 
support it, one must conclude that the terms “necessary” and “proper” are essentially the 
same and that the Constitution uses two words rather than one merely for emphasis.
A plausible meaning for “proper” that distinguishes it from the meaning of 
“necessary” is readily available.  Samuel Johnson’s first definition of “proper” was “1. 
Peculiar; not belonging to more; not common.”  His second, third, and fourth definitions 
were “2. Noting an individual.  3. One’s own . . . .  4. Natural; original.”  In the context of 
a provision granting legislative power to Congress, this would mean that a law that is 
“proper . . . for carrying into Execution” federal power is a law that peculiarly and 
naturally belongs to the national legislature.  With respect to a legislature of limited and 
enumerated powers that is situated within a governmental framework that is divided 
horizontally by principles of federalism and vertically by principles of separated powers, 
this would mean that executory laws must be the sorts of laws that would peculiarly and 
naturally belong to such a legislature.
The general validity of this approach is demonstrated by a number of textual and 
structural considerations.  First, in the two contexts in which Congress does not serve as a 
limited legislature, the word “proper” is conspicuously absent.  The Territory and Propery 
Clause grants Congress power to make “all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”116  The District and Enclave 
116 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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Clause gives Congress power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases 
whatsoever”117 over the nation’s capital and federal enclaves within states.  The 
difference in language between these provisions and the Sweeping Clause highlights the 
fundamental distinction between a general legislature – which describes Congress when it 
is legislating with respect to federal territory or property – and a limited legislature –
which describes Congress when it is legislating in other context.  One would not expect 
Congress, acting as a general legislature for federal territory, to have to worry about 
federalism issues or separation of powers principles that are not specifically reflected in 
the text – no more than one would expect a state government in an equivalent position to 
have to worry about such things.  This is consistent with the fact that the phrase 
“necessary and proper” did not appear in any state constitutions prior to the federal 
Constitution.  The state governments were all general rather than limited governments, 
which further points to the idea that the “necessary and proper” phrase is distinctively 
tailored to the limited character of the federal Congress.118
Second, an understanding of “necessary and proper” in which “necessary” refers 
to causal connections, or “fits,” and “proper” refers to substantive criteria, such as 
proportionality and consistency with background principles, conforms perfectly to the 
principle of reasonableness (as it is now called) that in the eighteenth century was at the 
117 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
118
   The phrase “necessary and proper” appeared in the Georgia state constitution shortly after ratification 
of the federal Constitution.  See Ga. Const. of 1789, art. I, § 16 (“The general assembly shall have power 
to make all laws and ordinances which they shall deem necessary and proper for the good of the State, 
which shall not be repugnant to this constitution”) (emphasis added).  For an explanation of how the 
intriguing phraseology of that provision further demonstrates the limited and limiting character of the word 
“proper” in the federal Sweeping Clause, see Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 313-14.
38
heart of English administrative law.119  The principle of reasonableness holds120 that
delegations of implementational power are always subject to the implied condition that 
exercises of such power must be reasonable.  In the classic application of the doctrine in 
Rooke’s Case,121 Sir Edward Coke explained that sewer commissioners exceeded their 
powers by forcing one landowner to bear the costs of repairs to a river bank that benefited 
many landowners, even though the authorizing statute placed no limit whatsoever on the 
commissioners’ discretion.122  Discretion, explained Lord Coke, “is a science or 
understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between 
shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences . . . .”123  In 
other words, delegated power always had to be exercised in a substantively reasonable 
fashion that took due account of the rights and interests of affected parties.  Later cases 
elaborated the principle of reasonableness by, for example, holding in 1773 in Leader v. 
Moxon that a statute giving paving commissioners power to make repairs “in such a 
manner as the commissioners shall think fit” did not authorize raising a street to such a 
level that it obstructed a citizen’s doors and windows.124  William Blackstone, who was 
119
   For a more detailed discussion of the principle of reasonableness and its relevance to American 
constitutional interpretation, see Lawson & Seidman, supra note 28, at 52-57.  One should strongly place 
the accent on the “Seidman” part of this pairing; I am profoundly indebted to Guy Seidman for pointing out 
to me the significance of the principle of reasonableness, of which I was blissfully unaware in 1993.
120
  Even today, the principle of reasonableness is a central precept of English administrative law.  See
H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 353 (8th ed. 2000).
121
 5 Co. Rep. 99b (1598).
122 See 23 H. 8 c. V, § 3, cl. 2-3, 4 Stat. at Large 223, 224 (1531) (giving sewer commissioners power to 
order repairs “as case shall require, after your wisdoms and discretions” and granting them power to 
apportion the costs of repairs as they “shall deem most convenient to be ordained”).
123
   5 Co. Rep. at 99b-100a.
124
   2 W. Bl. 924 (1828).  This Reporter covered cases in Westminster Hall from 1746-79; the decision in 
Leader v. Moxon was rendered in 1773.
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one of the judges in the latter case, referenced the principle of reasonableness, and its 
grounding in Rooke’s Case, in his Commentaries on the Law of England,125 which was a 
primary reference source for Americans of the founding generation.
Drawing together the basic features of the principle of reasonableness, one can 
say that it requires exercises of delegated power to be causally efficacious, measured and 
proportionate, and respective of background rights.  This principle constrains the federal 
executive and judicial powers under the American Constitution even without textual 
specification; the principle was part of the very nature of delegated executive and judicial 
power in the eighteenth-century English legal tradition.
The principle of reasonableness, however, did not apply to Parliament (or to the 
King in Parliament), because Parliament exercised inherent rather than delegated 
authority.  The federal Congress, of course, possesses only delegated rather than inherent 
legislative authority, so if the principle of reasonableness is seen as a facet of delegated 
power per se, the principle would bind Congress as well as executive and judicial actors, 
at least when Congress was exercising implementational powers (as opposed to the 
general powers of an unlimited legislature, which Congress possesses in some limited 
contexts).  But perhaps someone could argue, correctly or incorrectly, that Parliament 
was exempt from the principle of reasonableness simply because it was a legislative 
rather than executive or judicial body, in which case Congress, as a legislative body, 
would similarly be exempt.  A constitutional drafter who wanted Congress’s delegated 
implementational powers to be subject to the principle of reasonableness would likely 
look for some mechanism to avoid this inference.  The obvious answer is language that 
125
   3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 74 (1765).
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makes clear that the principle of reasonableness applies in America to all exercises of 
delegated implementational authority, including those exercised by the legislature.  The 
language “necessary and proper” performs this task quite elegantly.126  The term 
“necessary” describes the element of causal efficacy, and the term “proper” (interpreted 
in the Lawson/Granger manner) describes the substantive criteria, such as proportionality 
and respect for background rights, reflected in the foundational cases such as Rooke’s 
Case and Leader v. Moxon.  The Lawson/Granger interpretation of the Sweeping Clause 
reflects the principle of reasonableness that was a basic aspect of delegated power in the 
late eighteenth century.
The only textual, intratextual, or structural argument against the Lawson/Granger
position of which I am aware involves the grammatical structure of the Sweeping Clause, 
which 
focuses on whether legislation is proper for the purpose of carrying a given power 
into execution.  The text thus appears to address the relationship between the 
legislation and the legislative end in view, rather than, say, the relationship 
between Congress and the states.  This inference is strengthened by the fact that 
the companion term “necessary” is understood to regulate the means-end 
relationship.127
The argument begs the question. It assumes that the phrase “proper for carrying into 
Execution” can only concern means-ends relationships, which is the very point at issue.  
There is nothing linguistically odd about saying that a law is not “proper for carrying into 
Execution” a federal power if the law violates structural principles or other substantive 
126
   Why not just mention the principle of reasonableness by name?  Because it did not have a name in 
1788 that one could just mention.
127 Beck, supra note 111, at 341.  Evan Caminker has made a similar point.  See Evan H. Caminker, 
“Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1127, 1138 n.47 (2001) 
(“ ‘proper’ clearly modifies ‘for carrying into execution’ rather than the ‘laws’ themselves, and thus 
syntactically serves a teleological function”).
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criteria.128  It is only odd if one starts from the premise that the phrase “necessary and 
proper” only concerns the extent to which  laws “carry[] into Execution” federal power 
and not the manner in which they do so. That is precisely what we are trying to 
determine.  And given the presumption against construing the terms “necessary” and 
“proper” to be synonymous, the fact that the word “necessary” regulates the means-ends 
relationship supports rather than undercuts the Lawson/Granger thesis.
Textually, intratextually, and structurally, the word “proper” in the Sweeping 
Clause is best understood as a substantive term that does not merely duplicate the causal
function of the word “necessary.”  It requires Congress to legislate in a manner that 
respects substantive considerations .  In the American governmental structure, those 
substantive considerations include the prerogatives of the states and of competing federal 
institutions.  For a law to be “proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers, it must 
be substantively reasonable in light of the Constitution’s scheme of federalism and 
separated powers.
2.  Propriety and Externality
128
   That is why it is relevant – though not central – to the Lawson/Granger argument that other people 
have actually spoken as we do.  See Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 298-308.  If no one ever used the 
word “proper” to describe anything other than a causal means-end connection, it would be harder (though 
not impossible) to make the case that the word “proper” describes anything other than a causal means-end 
connection.
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All of the foregoing, of course, is highly abstract.129  What does it operationally 
mean to say that a “proper” executory law must respect principles of federalism and 
separated powers?
The Constitution is full of express clauses that concern federalism and separation 
of powers.  With respect to federalism, for instance, the Slave Trade Clause specifically 
forbade Congress until 1808 from interfering with the decision of states to permit the 
importation of slaves.130  With respect to separation of powers, for instance, the 
Appointments Clause specifically defines the role of Congress in appointing federal 
officers: it provides no role for Congress as such in the appointment  process, but provides 
an advise and consent role for the Senate and a role for Congress in determining when 
inferior officers may be appointed without the participation of the Senate.131 Perhaps an 
executory law fails to be “proper” if but only if it violates some such express prohibition.
That would indeed give the word “proper” a meaning different from the word 
“necessary,” but it would be a remarkably stupid meaning.  “Oh, by the way, don’t 
violate otherwise applicable provisions of the Constitution” is not an especially helpful 
129
   Posner and Vermeule do not like abstractions.  They regard them as unable to resolve specific 
questions, such as the existence vel non of a nondelegation principle.  See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 
1, at 1730 n.27 (decrying “banalities about the separation of powers”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 
1340 (complaining about arguments “pitched at a higher level of abstraction”).  That is often enough true to 
make the point a valuable one.  But that does not mean that abstractions cannot serve as premises in 
arguments that ultimately yield very specific conclusions.  That is how I am using abstractions – and I 
suspect that it is how everyone else that Posner and Vermeule criticize also uses them. 
130 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing 
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year on thousand eight 
hundred and eight”).
131 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, shall appoint . . . all . . . Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or 
in the Heads of Departments”).
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injunction.  That does not logically rule it out, but it does incline one to ask to see the 
evidence that the Constitution contains such a ridiculous provision.  There is no such 
evidence.
Some arguments about federalism and the separation of powers, of course, do not 
rely on express provisions such as the Slave Trade Clause, but instead rely on more 
complex and subtle inferences.  Suppose that one believes (as Posner and Vermeule, to 
their great credit, evidently do) that the Article II Vesting Clause affirmatively grants to 
the President the “executive Power,” which includes the power to execute federal laws.132
What if Congress now enacts a statute specifically instructing the President to arrest and 
prosecute certain suspected offenders and forbidding the President from arresting and 
prosecuting others?  There is no express clause in the Constitution that forbids Congress 
from doing this.  But if the Article II Vesting Clause is a grant of prosecutorial power to 
the President, it requires relatively little by way of inference to say that Congress cannot 
dictate the exercise of that power – just as Congress cannot tell courts how to decide 
specific cases.  When powers are granted to specific institutions within a scheme of 
divided government, it makes sense to presume (subject to rebuttal by contrary evidence) 
that the exercise of those powers cannot formally be dictated by other actors.   Perhaps a 
law can fail to be “proper for carrying into Execution” federal power if and only if it 
attempts in this way to control power vested in other actors even when there is no express 
prohibition against such control.
This understanding of “proper” would save Posner and Vermeule’s argument: the 
grants of discretion with which the traditional nondelegation doctrine is concerned do not 
132 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 108; Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses As Power Grants, 
88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1377 (1993).
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normally attempt to control powers vested in other actors.  But there is nothing to support 
this understanding of “proper” beyond the fact that it would save Posner and Vermeule’s 
argument.  Once it is admitted that at least some arguments from inference help define 
what counts as a “proper” executory law, one cannot rule out candidates for such 
arguments a priori.  One has to ask in each case whether the particular argument from 
inference does or not does not help define what counts as a “proper” executory law.
In the case of statutes purporting to control how the President or the courts carry 
out their functions, the relevant principle is what I have elsewhere called a principle of 
decisional independence, “under which each department should be understood to operate 
outside the direct control of other departments unless the Constitution instructs to the 
contrary.”133  No such principle expressly appears in the Constitution.  Nonetheless, there 
are a host of reasons why such a principle is more consistent with the overall structure of 
the Constitution than is the contrary principle that would allow Congress to dictate the 
decisionmaking of coordinate departments.134  It is straightforward and natural to read the 
word “proper” to refer at least to these kinds of principles derived from the Constitution’s 
internal structure.  Perhaps, then, the nondelegation principle can be grounded in the 
same manner as the principle of decisional independence; more on that in a moment.
The final question is whether the word “proper” can ever refer to principles that 
are not directly derivable from other constitutional provisions.  Posner and Vermeule, 
naturally enough, think not.  They claim that “ ‘proper’ has no work to do unless the 
relevant constitutional principle can be traced to some other valid source of constitutional 
133
   Lawson, supra note 107, at 204.
134 See id. at 205-07.
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law,”135 presumably meaning some other provision(s) of the Constitution.  The obvious 
test case is a statute enacted in 1789, before ratification of the Bill of Rights, that 
authorizes the use of general warrants to enforce the customs law (and, just to make it 
interesting, further requires congressional pre-approval of all newspaper editorials 
criticizing the use of general warrants unless the newspaper editors are Protestant).  There 
is no express prohibition in the original Constitution concerning the use of general 
warrants (or regulations of the press or religion).  Nor are there provisions from which 
one can make direct structural inferences against this kind of law comparable to the 
provisions from which one can infer a principle of interdepartmental decisional 
independence.  Would the law have been constitutionally authorized by the Sweeping 
Clause?
One could, of course, object to at least some of the law’s provisions as not 
“necessary” and hence as beyond the powers granted by the Sweeping Clause.  But can 
one kill the whole statute on the ground that it is not a law “proper for carrying into 
Execution” the customs laws?  It is, of course, conceivable that the original Constitution 
permits such a statute, from which we were rescued by the Bill of Rights.  Many 
supporters of the Bill of Rights obviously thought precisely this.136  But it is also 
conceivable that the reverse is true.  Many defenders of the original Constitution 
steadfastly maintained that the unamended Constitution gave Congress no power to 
authorize general warrants, regulate the press or religion, abolish the civil jury, or violate 
135
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1728 n.20.  Others have made similar claims.  See, e.g., Ernest A. 
Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1601, 1628-29 
(2000); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 S. Ct. Rev. 125, 201.
136 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 35, at 321-22.
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other cherished rights.137  The only plausible textual grounding for this position is the 
view that a “proper” law must (as the principle of reasonableness would demand) respect 
the rights and interests of the people – that is, that the word “proper” looks beyond the 
four corners of the rest of the Constitution to background principles that shape the (for 
lack of a better word) proper exercise of Congress’s implementational legislative 
power.138  The question is which conceivable view of the Sweeping Clause is, all things 
considered, a better view of the Constitution’s original meaning.
Is it relevant to this question that the founding-era arguments against the power of 
Congress to provide for general warrants and such were not generally based on express 
references to the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause? 139  Of course it is relevant – just 
as it is relevant that founding-era debates were not filled with references to Rooke’s Case.  
But the Constitution’s meaning consists of what a fully-informed audience would have 
believed, not what the the actual audience in fact believed.  If a reasonable observer in 
1788 would have listened to my argument about the word “proper” and its relation to the 
principle of reasonableness and said, “Yeah, that seems right,” then that reflects the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  The jurisdictional interpretation of “proper” dovetails 
so elegantly with so many background principles and understandings that it likely would 
137 See id. at 317-21, 322-23.
138
   This does not mean, of course, that the jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping Clause itself looks 
“outside” the Constitution.  The word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause is as much a part of the Constitution 
as is the word “Law” or “Commerce.”  The question is what the word “proper,” as it is used in the 
Sweeping Clause, means.  Whatever meaning one ultimately attributes to the word is a meaning that is 
“inside” rather than “outside” the Constitution.
139 See Beck, supra note 111, at 638-39.
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have commanded this kind of hypothetical consensus.140  Or, at least, so goes the 
argument.
The nondelegation doctrine is a part of any plausible view of the Sweeping 
Clause.  If one limits the scope of the word “proper” to inferences drawn primarily from 
intratextual and structural considerations, the nondelegation principle has the same status 
as the principle of decisional independence: it is not a principle expressly stated in the 
Constitution, but it is a better inference from the overall structure of the Constitution than 
is the contrary principle.  For fairly obvious reasons advanced by Alexander and Prakash 
in their response to Posner and Vermeule’s thesis,141 and by Mike Rappaport in a 
discussion that is (like most everything) given short shrift by Posner and Vermeule,142 it 
is a far more plausible view of the Constitution’s structural and procedural provisions to 
say that they limit the extent to which discretion can be conferred than to say the 
contrary.
Consider just the structure of Article I, section 8.  It’s first seventeen clauses 
contain provisions that give Congress power to perform such actions as to “lay and 
collect,” “borrow,” “regulate,” “establish,” “coin . . ., regulate . . . , and fix,” “provide,” 
“establish,” “promote . . . by securing,” “constitute,” “define and punish,” “declare . . ., 
grant . . . , and make Rules concerning,” “raise and support,” “provide and maintain,” 
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of,” “provide for calling forth,” 
140
   That does not necessarily mean that the word “proper” draws a principle of state sovereign immunity 
into the Sweeping Clause, as the Supreme Court has held in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999).  
I haven’t studied the question carefully enough to have a strong view either way.
141
   Alexander & Prakash, supra note 5, at 1300-03.
142
   Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line-Item Veto: A New 
Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 Tulane 
L. Rev. 265, 305-09 (2001).
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“provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,” and “exercise exclusive Legislation in 
all Cases whatsoever, over.”143  At the end of the list is a clause giving Congress power to 
make laws that are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” these other 
actions.  Exactly who, in this governmental scheme, is supposed to be doing the lion’s 
share of the laying and collecting, borrowing, regulating, establishing, coining, 
regulating, fixing, providing, establishing, promoting by securing, constituting, defining 
and punishing, declaring, granting, making Rules concerning, raising and supporting, 
providing and maintaining, making Rules for the Government and Regulation of, 
providing for calling forth, providing for organizing, arming, and disciplining, and 
exercising exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over?  It is really not very 
difficult to reach the conclusion that a law that puts the substance of these tasks in 
someone else’s hands is not a law “proper for carrying into Execution” these 
congressional powers because it puts too much strain on the obvious architecture of the 
document considered as a whole.  The point is not that one can logically deduce, in a 
strict fashion, the nondelegation doctrine from principles of federalism, separation of 
powers, bicameralism, and checks and balances, no more than one can logically deduce a 
principle of decisional independence.  The point, rather, is that the traditional 
nondelegation principle is more consistent with the government created by the 
Constitution than is the nondelegation principle advanced by Posner and Vermeule.  And 
at least one function of the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause is to “textualize” these 
143 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-17.
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background principles to insure that Congress obeys them when legislating under the 
Sweeping Clause.144
If the word “proper” imports the full range of background principles that frame 
the powers of the limited legislature in a limited, divided government created by the 
Constitution, it is even more obvious that extreme grants of discretion are out.  How 
could it be “proper” – or consistent with the principle of reasonableness – to make hash 
out of the Constitution’s allocation of governmental responsibilities?  One can, as Posner 
and Vermeule have done, logically imagine such a regime.  It is much harder to imagine a 
fully-informed eighteenth-century observer choosing the Posner/Vermeule regime as the 
best understanding of what constitutes a “necessary and proper” means for executing 
federal power.
All that is left – and all that was really there in the first place -- is Posner and 
Vermeule’s insistence that the Constitution’s allocation of governmental responsibilities 
is purely formal: the President’s “executive Power” just means the power to execute 
whatever statutes Congress enacts (and the judicial power presumably means the power 
to decide cases in accordance with whatever laws Congress enacts).  Those laws, of 
course, cannot violate express constitutional provisions – the President cannot execute a 
law delegating the formal right to vote or abolishing the slave trade before 1808145 – but 
otherwise, they say, the Constitution has nothing to say about the matter.
144
   Does that mean that Congress need not obey these principles when legislating through vehicles other 
than the Sweeping Clause, such as the Territory and Property Clause, or perhaps the Commerce Clause 
directly?  For an answer of “mostly yes,” see Lawson, supra note 107, at 208-10.
145 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1724, 1755.
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As should be evident by now, this is fundamentally wrong for two complementary 
reasons.  First, it begs (or, more precisely, incorrectly answers) all of the relevant 
questions concerning the meaning of the Sweeping Clause.  The Sweeping Clause does 
not authorize any conceivable laws for implementing federal powers that do not violate 
express constitutional prohibitions.  That is not what it says, and it is not what it means.  
If a statute “for carrying into Execution” federal power is not “necessary and proper” for 
that purpose, the President cannot execute it because it does not count as a law.  A law 
telling the President to go forth and promote goodness and niceness is no more “proper” 
than is a law forbidding the President from arresting certain individuals, telling courts to 
rule for certain plaintiffs, or (if one is prepared to take this step) authorizing the use of 
general warrants in 1789.
Second, Posner and Vermeule’s position turns on the view that the “executive 
Power,” in its law-implementing guise,146 is nothing more than the formal power to 
execute whatever statutes Congress enacts.147  But they nowhere explain why this view of 
the executive power is remotely plausible – much less more plausible than an alternative 
view such as, for instance, “the power to execute statutes, provided that those statutes do 
not put the President in the position of making rules for governance on important matters, 
though the President is permitted to make rules on ancillary matters.” This alternative 
view is exactly what the traditional nondelegation doctrine understands the “executive 
146
   The “executive Power” has other guises as well, such as the power to command the military, to make 
treaties, to govern occupied territory during wartime, and to conduct foreign affairs.  See Lawson & 
Seidman, supra note 28, at 47-51; Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over 
Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2000).
147 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1725-30.  Under this view, if Congress enacts 
unconstitutional statutes, then of course they may not be executed, but not because of any formal properties 
of the “executive Power.”
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Power” to involve.  That understanding of the “executive Power” has been advanced and 
defended by Mike Rappaport, who argues that this narrower conception of “executive 
Power” would have been seen as more plausible by an eighteenth-century observer 
because it better serves the Constitution’s scheme of separated powers, bicameralism, 
federalism, and checks and balances.148  Posner and Vermeule (weakly) respond that 
statutes vesting discretion formally comply with this scheme because they must be 
enacted in accordance with the Constitution’s presentment, bicameralism, and federalism 
provisions,149 but that badly misses the point.  The argument is not, as I have said, that 
one can rigorously deduce a nondelegation principle from the Constitution’s other 
provisions.  The argument is instead that a view of executive power that complements the 
background principles that underlie the Constitution’s formal lawmaking provisions 
would have been more likely to command the assent of an objective, fully-informed 
eighteenth-century observer than would the purely formal understanding of “executive 
Power” advanced by Posner and Vermeule.  Posner and Vermeule do not seem seriously 
to consider the possibility that the “executive Power” (and the corresponding duty to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”150) extends only to statutes of a 
particular kind and character.151  That is a grave mistake.
148 See Rappaport, supra note 142, at 305-09.
149
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1751.
150 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
151
   They do, however, raise questions about the extent to which broad grants of discretion would or would 
not disserve the values protected by presentment, bicameralism, etc.  See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, 
at 1750.  Those are not the right questions to raise.  For whatever reasons, in order to serve whatever 
values, the Constitution contains provisions that instantiate certain principles of separated powers, 
bicameralism, federalism, and checks and balances.  All else being equal, it makes more sense to assume 
that other provisions that relate to the same general subject matter as these instantiating provisions have 
meanings that cohere with the principles underlying these provisions than it does to assume the contrary.  
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It is clear that the “executive Power” does not include the power to act without 
statutory authorization by, for instance, acting as though there is a statute prohibiting 
abortions on federal property when there is not.152  It is also clear that the “executive 
Power” does not include the power to “interpret” laws in ridiculous ways by, for instance, 
“construing” the Administrative Procedure Act’s definition of adjudication153 to prohibit 
abortions on federal property.154  The principle of reasonableness holds at least that 
much.  But if not everything done by the President in the guise of executing a statute is an 
exercise of the “executive Power,” it is fair to ask why presidential action pursuant to 
crisp, clear legislative commands cannot ever be said to exceed the limits of the 
“executive Power” as the term is used in the Constitution.  If a reasonable observer in 
1788 was presented with the Goodness and Niceness Act, would he or she say that 
presidential regulations pursuant to that statute were simply an exercise of “executive 
Power,” or would he or she instead say that the power goes beyond the substantive 
content of the “executive Power”?  It is true that a Rappaport/Lawson view of “executive 
Power” that sees it as bounded by certain exercises of discretion is less rule-like than the 
purely formal view taken by Posner and Vermeule, but there is no good reason to think 
that all constitutional provisions should be interpreted in the most rule-like fashion 
possible.  If the best understanding of the Constitution as a whole has the “executive 
Power” stop before it reaches the power to make important rules for governance, 
That is the true meaning of formalism: the provisions have meaning independent of the extent to which 
they actually serve the values that motivated them.
152
   On this, at least, we all agree.  See Lawson, supra note 14, at 340; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 
1725; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1333.
153
   5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2000) (“ ‘adjudication’ means agency process for the formulation of an order”).
154 See Lawson, supra note 14, at 339-40, 344-45.
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Congress cannot authorize the President to make such rules.  And for essentially the same 
reasons that the Sweeping Clause is best read not to authorize Congress to grant limitless 
discretion to the President, the Article II Vesting Clause is best read not to permit the 
President to receive any such grant of discretion from Congress.
But didn’t the First Congress grant precisely such limitless discretion to the 
President?  Posner and Vermeule have invoked, as did opponents of the nondelegation 
doctrine before them,155 a series of statutes from the First Congress that vest considerable 
discretion in executive agents.156  I dealt with these statutes at length in an earlier work.  
Most fundamentally, I argued (echoing a much more elaborate argument from Steve 
Calabresi and Sai Prakash157) that enactments of the First Congress are at best very weak 
evidence of original meaning.158 Secondarily, I showed that most of these early statutes 
grant a kind and quantity of discretion that is consistent with the traditional nondelegation 
doctrine.159  The nondelegation doctrine, after all, does not forbid Congress from vesting 
any discretion, or even a considerable degree of discretion, in other agents.  It permits 
Congress to grant discretion with respect to matters ancillary to a statutory scheme, but 
155 See 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6, at 66 (3d 
ed. 1994).
156
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1735-36; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1340.
157
   Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 108, at 551-59.
158 See Lawson, supra note 14, at 398:
Enactments of early Congresses are particularly suspect because members of Congress, even those 
who participated in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, are not disinterested observers.  
They are political actors, responding to political as well as legal influences, who are eminently 
capable of making mistakes about the meaning of the Constitution.  Their work product constitutes 
post-enactment legislative history that ranks fairly low down on the hierarchy of reliable evidence 
concerning original meaning.
159 See id. at 396-402.
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forbids grants of discretion on fundamental matters.  The First Congress generally 
conformed to this principle.  The few statutes that do not seem consistent with the 
traditional nondelegation doctrine are no threat to the nondelegation doctrine because 
they either involve subjects, such as military or foreign affairs matters, in which the 
Constitution permits Congress to grant the President more than the usual measure of 
discretion160 or represent mistakes committed by a fallible First Congress.
Posner and Vermeule are unconvinced.  Without disputing the general 
methodological objection to heavy reliance on early legislative enactments, they claim 
that because “[a]ll of the affirmative originalist evidence for the delegation metaphor . . . 
is also post-ratification material . . . [,] [t]o take Lawson’s objection seriously is to wipe 
out all of the affirmative founding-era evidence that nondelegation proponents 
possess.”161  Posner and Vermeule have a strange understanding of what counts as 
“affirmative originalist evidence.”162  The argument for the nondelegation doctrine that I 
have constructed, here and elsewhere, does not rely at all on “snippets from Madison and 
early legislators.”163  Nor could it, given my methodological predilections.  Such 
statements are (even if only barely) admissible evidence of original meaning, but they are 
hardly the focus of argument for a reasonable-observer originalist.  The “affirmative 
originalist evidence” for the nondelegation doctrine consists precisely of the arguments 
from text, structure, and principle that point towards a construction of the Sweeping 
160 See Rappaport, supra note 142, at 310, 346-53.
161
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1736 n.61.
162
   They also have a mistaken view about exactly who has the burden of producing affirmative evidence 
on this point.  See supra XX.
163 Id.  I made that very clear in my last article on this subject.  See Lawson, supra note 14, at 341 n.51.
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Clause (and the Article II Vesting Clause) that limits the extent to which Congress may 
confer discretion on the President.  That argument does not rely, in any fundamental 
sense, on evidence of concrete historial understandings, from the First Congress or 
otherwise.
With respect to the substance of the statutes, Posner and Vermeule retreat to their 
favorite redoubt: the ad hominem.  “Nondelegation proponents,” they exclaim, “may chip 
away at the early statutes as much as they please, adding ingenious epicycles to square 
the statutes with the theory, but the cumulative impression that these statutes create is that 
early Congresses just didn’t take constitutional objections to delegation very 
seriously.”164  I confess to being quite fond of the “ingenious epicycles” label – the 
epicycles, of course, were astoundingly accurate as tools for predicting planetary motions 
in all but the most extreme cases – but I am a bit less willing to accept the 
characterization of a detailed, painstaking four-page discussion of founding-era statutes, 
superimposed upon another entire article that further addresses some of these statutes,165
as an attempt to “chip away” at anything.  I rather think that, between us, Mike Rappaport 
and I smoked their claims about  founding-era statutes pretty thoroughly .  The point, 
however, is of only of minor interest as far as original meaning is concerned.166
IV.  (Very Brief) Concluding Remarks
164
   Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1737 n.61.
165 See Rappaport, supra note 142.
166
   Of even less interest, I suppose, is evidence from the Second Congress showing deep constitutional 
concern on the part of some Members about delegations of broad authority to the President with respect to 
the location of post roads.  See Lawson, supra note 14, at 402-03.  Posner and Vermeule do not appear to 
have anything to say about this evidence.
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  The evidence from text, intratextual analysis, structure, and background 
principles that forms the bedrock of any good (reasonable-observer) originalist argument 
overwhelmingly shows that the Constitution imposes limits on the extent to which 
Congress can grant discretion to other actors.  That leaves the difficult task of figuring 
out exactly how much and what kind of discretion Congress may grant.167  But that task, 
rather than the burial of the nondelegation doctrine, is the task set upon us by the 
Constitution.
167 For my lengthy crack at this task, see id. at 353-95.
